Forscom training guidance for follow-on forces deploying iso southwest asia

A contract for the final twenty-three sets required to outfit all active Army units was signed on 29 July During the year the Army received twenty-three sets ordered under previous contracts; final deliveries were in April Because of the break in the program, deliveries will not be resumed until the summer of The Army's plan to obtain 7, M60A3 tanks with thermal tank sights-1, from new production and 5, through conversion of older M60 series tanks-moved forward.

By the close of the reporting period, 1, new M60A3s and 1, conversions had been funded. Conversion of M60A1 tanks to an M60A3 configuration began in July at the Anniston Army Depot, and a similar program will get under way involving vehicles at the Mainz Army Depot early in fiscal year Earlier plans to convert the mm.

The sophistication and complexity of technologically advanced systems entering the Army's weapons arsenal has caused concern within the Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense regarding how much combat support structure would be required to sustain U.

The result of this concern was the Combat to Support Balance Study CSBS , a sixteen-volume report published in September which showed the effects that various assumptions regarding workload, productivity, and the amount of host nation support would have on the size of combat service support forces. The study has served as an effective management tool for decision makers in determining appropriate levels, mixes, and phases of support for programmed Army combat forces in Europe.

Host nation support HNS , an important element in the CSBS, is essential in satisfying shortfalls in the Army's ability to meet combat support and combat service support requirements of forward deployed and deploying U.

Forces Over the past year the Army has continued HNS initiatives in the areas of policy guidance, doctrine formulation, and combat support and combat service support negotiations.

Army HNS policies, procedures, and responsibilities were laid out for the first time in Army Regulation , published in January The group's broad objective is to. The first priority will be to acquire host nation support for the near-term RDF; the second priority is to acquire this support for future expansion of the RDF and to develop a strategy for entering HNS negotiations with certain Southwest Asia countries.

Negotiations for expanded host nation support for forward deployed and reinforcing forces continued. The signing of a memorandum of understanding MOU with Germany is expected soon, and work on detailed agreements covering military support, civil support, and reinforcement exercises is to begin in January A considerable portion of the support will be provided by German military units.

HNS statements of principle have been signed with all of the countries except the Netherlands. They have agreed to provide the requested support. Detailed requirements will be set down in lines of communications LOC agreements. Umbrella, general, and technical agreements have been signed with Denmark, Norway, and Italy. More recently, complementary efforts have been initiated to redesign the light division, the corps, echelons above corps, and contingency corps.

Collectively, these several design initiatives are referred to as Army The process by which these initiatives and other near-term redesigns of various Army elements, including the Rapid Deployment Force, are incorporated into the force structure constitutes the Army 90 Transition Plan. In May , Army 90 transition planning objectives were prepared to integrate approved organizational conversions into the force structure requirements process; to develop organizational conversions down to unit identification code UIC level of detail for active and reserve components; and to develop UIC conversions which accommodate all relevant factors, including systems modernization, doctrine, training, manpower, logistic support, facilities and construction, tactical support, stationing, and operational readiness.

The objectives also envisaged publication of an annual transition plan to document organizational conversions over the program years, to institutionalize the planning process and management structure for guiding and directing the transition process, and to provide necessary resource man-.

In July , major commands were provided with guidance needed to develop a detailed Army 90 Transition Plan to be forwarded to the Army staff by 15 January One of the key features of the plan was that similar heavy division active units were to convert to the new designs during six-month periods starting in the last part of fiscal year ; conversions of reserve components other than roundout units would start one year later.

The 9th Infantry Division's High Technology Test Bed HTTB program, reported on last year, is an important element in fielding a, strategically deployable, lean, hard-hitting, and sustainable high technology light division by Eugene Fubini, began a study to determine how technology could be integrated into the High Technology Light Division.

The Concepts Analysis Agency CAA is responsible for Part I of the study, which pertains to short-term improvements in theater-level casualty estimates under conventional warfare conditions. The AMIP office will develop detailed methodology for Army wartime casualty estimation in two categories: 1 conventional plus chemical and 2 conventional, chemical and nuclear. The remainder of the study will then be accomplished by the AMIP, with developmental work continuing through calendar year Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, beginning in February , developed the current aviation force structure.

Based on study results, the Army Chief of Staff approved an aviation force structure consisting of 48 attack helicopter companies, 38 air cavalry troops, 46 combat support aviation companies, and 32 medium helicopter companies.

Implementation of ARCSA III continued during the year with the inactivation of an aviation battalion and four separate companies, two of which were divisional support companies. In turn, two combat aviation battalions were activated, one at Fort Hood and the other at Fort Riley, while a combat aviation company was activated to support the brigade at Fort Benning.

It will consider all Army 90 designs that have a major impact on the aviation force structure. Force designs coming from the Army 86 studies reflect ideas embodied in the Airland Battle, an evolving concept that describes current thinking on what is needed to win on the battlefield of the s, especially in Western Europe. It envisages the integration of conventional, nuclear, chemical, and electronic means and the extension of the battlefield to bring the full potential of U.

The concept of an extended battlefield with emphasis on maneuvering, disrupting enemy follow-up forces, and seizing the initiative by attacking, as well as defeating enemy assault elements, goes considerably beyond current doctrine for the use of corps and divisions.

While the Army revamped its combat doctrine around concepts that incorporated the use of conventional, chemical, and nuclear means to meet the threat posed by Warsaw Pact forces, little progress was made during the past year to limit or ban chemical and nuclear weapons.

Since , the United States and the Soviet Union have held twelve rounds of talks to reach a joint proposal for presentation before the United Nations Committee on Disarmament that would form the basis for negotiation of a multilateral chemical arms control treaty.

The U. Progress in the bilateral discussions has lagged because of disagreement over verification, declaration of stocks and facilities, and when the ban would take effect.

The Reagan administration put off the thirteenth round of U. Delays in holding bilateral talks and the lack of progress in the discussions held to date will intensify pressure on the Committee on Disarmament's Warfare Working Group, which was established in to define chemical weapons control issues, to begin negotiation of a treaty.

SALT Policy. Encouraged by Soviet propaganda, intense pressure was brought to bear on the United States to commence the arms-control side of the two-track modernization decision. Almost six years of study and work came to fruition in July with the publication of Field Manual , "Ammunition Service in the Theater of Operations. Army Missile and Munitions Center and School. The manual establishes doctrine for ammunition transfer points ATP in the brigade trains of divisions and separate brigades, replaces the direct support and general support conventional ammunition company with separate direct support DS and general support GS units, combines existing DS and GS special ammunition companies into a DS-GS unit, improves the man to machine ratio to provide for increased efficiency, and incorporates the throughput of ammunition into doctrine.

During the Total Army Analysis TAA for fiscal years , all active and reserve component conventional ammunition units were scheduled for conversion to the new MS3 tables of organization and equipment. The conversions were spread. Special ammunition companies are listed in the extended planning annex, pending receipt of major command advice concerning program timing. Mobilization planning and testing continued to be a major concern within the Army and throughout the Department of Defense.

MOBEX 80 tested the Army's critical mobilization and deployment procedures and provided the first opportunity to apply recommendations contained in the Army Command and Control Study, which stemmed from concerns of the Army and of the Office of the Secretary of Defense that the reserve component command structure was excessively layered and redundant. MOBEX 80 was most successful in providing valuable mobilization and deployment experience to many command and staff personnel throughout the Army.

The training function, verifying capabilities, and identifying training deficiencies are primary objectives of the MOBEX series. And while no new major problems surfaced, results clearly showed that problems and deficiencies uncovered during MOBEX 76 and 78 had not been resolved, particularly in the areas of command and control, ammunition and equipment shortfalls, filler requirements, and the ability of industry to resupply basic items required to sustain the combat forces. The Army formed the Mobilization Review Committee and the General Officer Mobilization Review Group to ensure that action would be taken to remedy shortcomings that hampered the Army's ability to meet mobilization and deployment requirements.

The first committee reviews and monitors remedial action projects RAPS , makes decisions regarding the sufficiency of proposed corrections, and recommends actions to the General Officer Mobilization Review Group on major issues.

The other group acts on the recommendations and directs measures to be taken on these issues. Both bodies include representatives from the Army staff and major commands. An Army staff proponent. At the Four Star Mobilization Conference held on 31 January and chaired by the Army Vice Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans was directed to coordinate the review of information requirements for the purpose of streamlining reporting procedures to provide only essential information to HQDA.

The first involved a review of data elements currently available to HQDA from automated data processing systems accessible through the Worldwide Military Command and Control System to extract only essential data elements in crisis situations.

The second was a user survey of selected reports sponsored by the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to identify nonessential reporting requirements and to streamline the joint Reporting Structure, particularly for wartime information needs. The third effort was to identify critical information requirements for crisis management regardless of the capabilities of currently automated systems.

The three efforts focused on efficiently using automated data sources and providing instructions for manual reporting where necessary, while guiding the development of automation improvements. As a result of an analysis of information needs, use of transaction processing, and coordination with Forces Command, a reduction of 67 percent has been achieved in the data required by HQDA to monitor the status of force mobilization.

Similar coordination with the joint Deployment Agency has resulted in a percent reduction of data needed by HQDA to monitor the status of force deployment. For example, more than half of the data currently required from Army units to compile the report is not considered essential by the Army staff for wartime management.

Further refinement and subsequent modification of joint reporting instructions will be undertaken in the coming fiscal year. These documents will establish the requirement, unconstrained by limitations in current automated reporting systems, as a baseline for future improvements. Additionally, the U. AMOPS, described in some detail in last year's summary, is an integrated, short-range, capability planning system which supports Army participation in joint operations and deployment.

Principal planning documents produced by the system are the HQDA Mobilization Plan and the major command mobilization plans, which collectively form the Army Mobilization Plan. The committee, chaired by the Director of Operations, OJCS, consists of general and flag officer representatives from the joint staff and the services.

The Army also provided a full-time action officer as a member of the joint working group which assisted the committee in assessing deficiencies, formulating objectives, and putting together recommendations for corrective action. The committee identified a number of major deficiencies: the current contingency planning process was regionally oriented and not based on real capabilities; it did not support deliberate planning and crisis response requirements and contained no option developing capability for the JCS and the National Command Authority; deployment planning did not provide for meaningful collection of information at appropriate command levels; and deployment execution was not flexible.

Action through the end of the fiscal year focused on developing a model for a new joint process which would be both a. It would support the application and direction of military force with the responsiveness and flexibility required by the National Command Authority; allow changes of direction and graduated application of force; give the capability to determine combat support and combat service support forces, materiel and transportation requirements, and shortfalls; and provide for the assessment of the total force's ability to meet national military strategy in the near term.

The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in collaboration with the military departments, developed plans for allocating among the services the , ready reservists that the President could order to active duty without declaring a national emergency, as provided for by Public Law , which the President signed on 23 December Before the new law went into effect the number of reservists who could be called was limited to 50, The Army allocated its portion to the major commands to meet premobilization requirements for minor contingencies or as a prelude to a declaration of mobilization.

The importance of industrial support and the condition of the training base received a great deal of attention during MOBEX 80 and throughout the remainder of fiscal year In November , ODCSRDA hosted chief executives from various industries to hear their views on what actions the Army should take to enhance the responsiveness of the industrial base and the effectiveness of planning with industry.

The conferees noted that significant improvement in industrial preparedness depended upon a clear national policy citing the need for an industrial base responsive to national security interests and that war reserve stocks should be increased to a level compatible with the ability of the base to meet sustaining requirements.

Associated with war reserve stocks was the need to identify production constraints and to pace items, with the view of stockpiling those components or items which have long lead-times.

There was general agreement that both the private and Army owned industrial base should be modernized to ensure adequate industrial production in an emergency situation. With a team of extremely dedicated and quality lecturers, cdv training army online will not only be a place to share knowledge but also to help students get inspired to explore and. Training Free -onlinecourses. Army Training Holidays ….

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Best armypubs. Save www. Without understanding the different needs of the Iraqi people, Americans easily can misunderstand Iraqi priorities. Figure 3 takes the same Iraqi hierarchy of needs and lists the Coalition Force's progression of military objectives beside those needs, leading to the goal of a free and independent Iraq.

Note that the Iraqis' need for securing food, water, shelter and safety call for the most Coalition Force support time, energy, and dollars and make the Iraqis most vulnerable to coercion by insurgents-most vulnerable to insurgent acts of violence.

Only when the Iraqis' or any people's needs are met at the lower levels will they be able to move up the pyramid. Understanding the Iraqi culture within the context of the people's priorities and vulnerabilities allows Soldiers and their leaders to understand situations in Iraq more accurately. Identifying Leaders. Soldiers can use some practical techniques to demonstrate their cultural understanding, allowing them to more effectively accomplish the mission.

A colleague of mine, Bassam Almesfer, a native of the Gulf Region, served as a language and cultural interpreter for the U. Bassam shared the following scenario relating the relevance of cultural awareness to operations in theater.

This incident laid the foundation for establishing a relationship with the cleric, and we were able to secure his cooperation on many other matters in the area for months to come. As a result, we conducted visits to the area with ease and communicated with many people in and around Najaf. The key points are that we identified the leader and treated him with respect: called him "Sir," asked him for permission to speak to him, were profusely apologetic about the difficult situation, and escorted him to his destination safely.

This culturally informed approach allowed us to build a long-term relationship that proved beneficial to our mission. Showing Elders Respect.

Bassam Almesfer also described visits to neighboring villages where he took extra care to stop and extend greetings to elders in the area. He taught Soldiers within his sphere of influence to take extra care when they saw elders and always to treat them with respect as a demonstration that the Soldiers recognized the dignity of the elders in the tribal system and honored them.

As a result, Americans gained the villagers' trust and were able to consult with the elders frequently. The elders used their power and prestige to help the Soldiers conduct more effective missions. Iraqi elders are the "hidden jewels" of the operational area. In their villages and tribes, they have the final word and can influence many by their status and power. Taking Time to Socialize. Arabs are firmly entrenched within a system of allegiances. They follow a code of honor and are loyal to family, tribe and or clan with Islam permeating their everyday lives-on every level from personal to political.

To build trust and relationships that can facilitate change and the success of their operations, Soldiers and leaders must get to know their Arab contacts within the context of these strong influences. Therefore, it is worthwhile to invest time just sitting in coffee shops with locals and talking about the village, the tribe, the weather, or whatever they choose to discuss. When the locals know Soldiers and leaders are coming to the market to drink tea instead of always "conducting operations," then the atmosphere is more relaxed and people get to know the Soldiers and become more responsive and helpful.

Unhurried time spent with Arabs establishes a highly valued bond and a level of trust that only can be earned. It is critical that Soldiers and leaders have trusted local sources of information to help them ferret out insurgents in a neighborhood or be forewarned of ambushes on "the only paved road in town.

On the other hand, using fear as a tactical tool to get information does not establish trust or create loyalty. But as a rule, trust and loyalty that go both ways is critical for Iraqis to feel safe and help units accomplish their missions. Even though the political climate is changing, people in the Middle East have chosen to remain the same for hundreds of years. Their cultural values, beliefs, norms, and behaviors continue to play a fundamental role in real-life situations throughout the region.

By being culturally aware and investing time in the locals, Bassam Almesfer's Soldiers fostered friendly relations with locals and had no life-threatening incidents in their area of operations AO on either side for more than a year and one-half.

Other Tactical Techniques. At the tactical level, there are many things Soldiers and leaders can do to build relationships and influence the people in counterinsurgency operations.

Here are a few of them. Ignoring a people's culture leaves Soldiers and leaders ignorant of the broader negative consequences their actions can have and of the broader positive effects their cultural awareness could have on accomplishing the mission. The mission is to move the Iraqi people up the Maslow's hierarchy toward security and total independence. Colonel Christopher P. One major deficiency being addressed is the lack of Afghan females to serve as trainers for Afghan female cultural training.

Another deficiency identified by leaders and Soldiers is that cultural training is too generic and not focused on duty requirements. Numerous U. Army training centers and schools as a means to facilitate Afghan culture and language training.

One such program is hosted by the University of Nebraska at Omaha and is designed to immerse Soldiers in Afghan culture. The program consists of a series of seminars focusing on Afghan language, culture, history, geography, natural resources, and current issues.